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Section I: Introduction 
The adequacy of pension income has been to the fore in policy discussions for many years 
and in many countries. As noted by Mitchell and Phillips (2006) replacement rates are often 
used in these discussions. However, Mitchell and Phillips (2006), Biggs and Springstead 
(2008), Brady (2008) and MacDonald et al (2016) have all raised questions about the 
definition of replacement rates in the context of pensions. Similarly, they have each 
questioned the meaningfulness of policy targets that are stated in terms of replacement 
rates which are often loosely defined. 
Ireland is among those countries where policy-makers have been, and continue to be, 
concerned about pension adequacy. Across the National Pensions Policy Initiative (The 
Pensions Board, 1998), the Green Paper on Pensions (The Department of Social and Family 
Affairs, 2007) and an OECD review of the Irish pension system (2014), targets have been set 
with respect to pension coverage and adequacy. In the case of the 2007 Green Paper, it was 
suggested that policy should aim to see state-provided and occupational pensions 
combining to replace “50 percent of pre-retirement earnings” (para 1.12). 
In this paper, we provide new estimates of retirement income replacement rates for Ireland. 
Our objective in doing this is two-fold. First, we want to build on previous work by Nivakoski 
(2014) and to look at the distribution of replacement rates. Ireland is somewhat unusual 
amongst OECD countries in that state social welfare pensions are generally flat-rate and not 
earnings related. As shown by Nivakoski, this leads to a distribution of replacement rates 
which is much more equal when compared to the distribution in earnings. Nivakoski’s 
earlier work was based on cross-sectional data but in this paper we use longitudinal data 
which offer advantages that are set out below. Our second goal is to assess what our 
estimates imply about the appropriateness of a policy goal such as a 50 percent 
replacement rates. We find high replacement rates for low income people so the question 
arises as to whether the actual level of income in retirement is a more meaningful policy 
goal below some point in the income distribution.  
This paper uses data from The Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing (TILDA). As TILDA is a 
longitudinal study, the same survey participants have been interviewed at Wave 1 (mainly in 
2010), Wave 2 (in 2012) and Wave 3 (in 2014). As a result of this survey design, we are able 
to identify people who are employed at one survey wave but retired by the next. This allows 
us to examine labour earnings and pension income in real time, thereby reducing any 
possibility of recall error which may have impacted upon Nivakoski’s earlier results. The data 
also facilitate an examination of how replacement rates vary across a number of factors 
such as gender, education and occupation. By generating these real-time data on 
replacement rates using a representative sample of the population, we aim to provide an 
important input into the on-going policy deliberations, mentioned above. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the remainder of this introduction, we provide a brief 
overview of Ireland’s pensions system. In Section 2, we describe the data in more detail and 
how the sample used in the analysis is constructed. We also describe how we calculate the 
key variable of interest, the retirement income replacement rate. In Section 3, we present 
our findings on replacement rates and how the rates vary across groups. Section 4 
concludes with some reflections on the policy implications. 
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We turn now to the brief description of Ireland’s pension system. The Irish pension system 
can be divided into three pillars: i) State welfare pensions, ii) occupational pensions, and iii) 
private pensions.2 The first pillar provides a basic level of income for older people, and it is 
paid to most people of pension age. The other two (supplementary pension) pillars are 
typically linked to earnings. 
As mentioned above, the first pillar pensions are flat-rated (not linked to earnings), 
providing a basic level of income. These payments consist of the Contributory and Non-
contributory State welfare pensions.3 To qualify for either of these pensions, an individual 
must have reached the State Pension Age (SPA) of 66 years. 4  Entitlements to the 
Contributory pension, delivered on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis from the Social Insurance 
Fund (SIF), are built up over the working life of an individual through the accumulation of 
Pay-Related Social Insurance (PRSI) credits, and the payments are not means-tested. 
Between 2010 and 2014, when the majority of TILDA data used in this paper were collected, 
the maximum gross payment rate was EUR 230.30 per week per person. The Non-
contributory State welfare pension is a means-tested payment. It is not dependent on past 
employment history and is financed through general taxation. In order to qualify for the 
Non-contributory State welfare pension, a person must not be eligible for the Contributory 
State welfare pension, pass a means test based on both income and wealth, and be 
habitually resident in Ireland. Between 2010 and 2014, the maximum pre-tax rate of 
payment was EUR 219 per week per person. 
The second and third pillars consist of supplementary pensions, over and above the State 
welfare pensions. Contributions to supplementary pensions are deductible from income 
taxation (up to certain limits). Occupational pensions are common in public sector 
employment in Ireland but are also a feature of private sector employment, especially in 
larger firms, where most schemes are funded. There is no legal obligation for employers to 
provide occupational pension schemes. Public service occupational pension schemes are in 
place for staff in the civil service, local authorities, Garda Siochana (the Irish police), the 
defence forces, the health and education sectors and non-commercial State bodies. Public 
service pension schemes are mainly statutory, and virtually all of the schemes are financed 
on a PAYG basis. Private pensions are voluntary and consist of Retirement Annuity Contracts 
(RACs) and Personal Retirement Savings Accounts (PRSAs). RACs are commonly used by the 
self-employed. PRSAs which were introduced in 2002 with an aim of increasing pension 
coverage among low-coverage employee groups. Contributions to private pension plans are 
generally made by the employee only. Employers must offer access to a PRSA to any 
employee who is not eligible to join an occupational pension scheme. 
 
Section 2: The data, the sample and the methodology 
                                                          
2 More details are found in the Department of Social and Family Affairs (2007) and OECD (2014). 
3 The Transition State welfare pension was payable from age 65 but had higher contribution requirements than 
the Contributory State welfare pension. It was abolished in 2014. 
4 State Pension Age (SPA) is depends on the year of birth of the individual as outlined in the Social Welfare and 
Pensions Act of 2011. It is 66 for those born before 1954, 67 for those born between 1954 and 1960 and 68 for 
those born in or after 1961. 
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The data for this analysis come from The Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing (TILDA). The 
data collection under TILDA began in 2009. Information was gathered on a sample of over 
8,000 people aged 50 and over and their partners and spouses, including those aged under 
50. The first wave achieved a response rate of 62 per cent. The survey covers topics such as 
income and wealth, demographics, health and labour force status. A detailed health 
assessment was conducted in Wave 1, and repeated every second subsequent wave.  
The longitudinal structure of TILDA data makes it possible to examine changes in peoples’ 
circumstances, including labour force status, health status, and living arrangements. Income 
changes could also be identified.  
In this paper, we exploit the longitudinal nature of TILDA and it is important to describe how 
we arrive at the sample used in the analysis that follows. We focus on people who were 
interviewed in more than one wave and who describe themselves as being “employed” in 
one wave (1 or 2) and then “retired” in the subsequent wave (2 or 3). The number falling 
into this category is 419. However, we can only use cases where people have provided us 
with income data in both their pre- and post-retirement interviews. For this reason, our 
sample falls to 354. 
In Table 1, we present information on the characteristics of the people in the sample used in 
the analysis below. We also provide information on all employees in the data so that 
comparisons are possible. The data on the sample used here are broken up between those 
retiring between Waves 1 and 2 and between Waves 2 and 3. The data on all employees are 
presented separately for Waves 1 and 2. As can be seen, the majority of those retiring are 
aged 60-70 and the age distribution of those retiring is very different from the age 
distribution of employees. We also see higher rates of retirement among public sector 
employees compared to their proportion of employees. This may have been a function of 
retirement arrangements in place for public servants. There appear to be lower rates of 
retirement among semi-skilled and unskilled occupations compared to their representation 
among employees generally, and higher rates of retirement among higher income groups. 
It is useful to discuss two elements of the TILDA sample of employees as they may appear 
surprising. First, the female/male split is slightly over 60/40. There a number of reasons for 
this. First, women were generally more likely to participate in the study. Second, men in the 
sample were more likely than women to be self-employed. As we are excluding the self-
employed, this further influences the gender balance in the sample.  
The second potentially surprising element is the relatively even split between public and 
private sector employees. Comparing these estimates with data from the CSO’s Quarterly 
National Household Survey (QNHS), the estimates are largely similar for the age group in 
question: the QNHS data for 2010 show that 42 per cent of employees aged 50 to 64 are 
working in the public sector. 
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Table 1: Description of all employed, and those who subsequently retire 
 All employees Transition into retirement 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 W1 → W2 W2 → W3 
  per cent  per cent  per cent  per cent 
Age group     
<60 years 76.7 73.1 42.7 37.2 
60-70 years 22.1 25.4 54.9 61.5 
>70 years 1.2 1.4 2.4 1.4 
     
Gender      
Male 39.0 37.2 45.6 35.1 
Female 61.0 62.8 54.4 64.9 
     
Education     
Primary/none 13.8 12.7 14.1 18.2 
Secondary 43.1 41.0 43.2 37.8 
Third/higher 43.1 46.3 42.7 43.9 
     
Location     
Dublin 26.7 26.5 28.8 34.0 
Other town/city 27.8 27.2 28.3 31.3 
Rural 45.4 46.2 42.9 34.7 
     
Employment sector     
Private 49.9 51.7 34.0 47.3 
Public 50.1 48.3 66.0 52.7 
     
Part-time / Full-time     
Part-time 30.1 29.6 34.0 43.2 
Full-time 69.9 70.4 66.0 56.8 
     
Marital status     
Married 77.9 78.2 71.8 70.9 
Never married 8.4 7.6 12.1 12.2 
Separated/divorced 8.7 9.4 8.7 8.8 
Widowed 5.0 4.8 7.3 8.1 
     
Occupation type     
Professional / Managerial / Technical 33.0 31.1 54.6 34.9 
Non-manual / Skilled manual 41.3 42.2 26.8 45.9 
Semi-skilled / Unskilled  25.6 26.7 18.6 19.2 
     
Earnings category (EUR/week, gross)     
0 1.5 1.8 n/a n/a 
1-299 17.0 16.3 18.4 20.9 
300-699 35.7 36.0 27.2 31.8 
700-1000 18.0 19.1 16.5 16.9 
1000+ 27.9 26.8 37.9 30.4 
     
Sample size 2,189 1,712 206 148 
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Having described the data and the sample, the last item to be discussed before presenting 
the analysis is the calculation of the retirement income replacement rate. The basic formula 
is as follows: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 ∗ 100 
 
For each individual, pension income refers to gross weekly income and is made up of (a) the 
state welfare pension (pillar I), (b) occupational pension income (pillar II) and (c) private 
pension income (pillar III). Gross weekly labour earnings is taken from the survey wave 
where they indicated that they were still “employed”. 
Section 3: Incomes and replacement rates 
We now turn to the main objective of the paper and present estimates of replacement rates 
and the distribution of the rates. We begin our presentation by examining the distribution 
of labour earnings for our sample and will then look at pension incomes before bringing the 
two together as replacement rates. We do this because the patterns observed for 
replacement rates will be better understood if the underlying components are known.  
In Figure 1, we present gross weekly labour earnings: part a) shows the medians and part b) 
the means. The figures are also presented in number form in Appendix Table A1, along with 
their standard deviations. Median weekly labour earnings in our sample is EUR 700, with the 
mean being EUR 899. These values differ across different groups and in expected ways. For 
example, the mean weekly labour earnings for men is EUR 1,051 whereas for women, it is 
EUR 793. These figures imply a female-to-male wage ratio of 75 per cent. Labour income 
rises with education and with occupational level. Public sector employees are shown to earn 
more than private sector employees. Finally, full-time workers earn more than part-time 
workers.  
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Figure 1: Labour earnings 
a) medians 
 
b) means 
 
*Education level: 1: None / primary, 2: Secondary, 3: Third level / higher 
** Occupation types: 1: Semi-skilled/Unskilled, 2: Non-manual/Skilled manual, 3: Professional/Managerial/Technical   
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In Figure 2, we examine pension income for our sample. Again, part a) shows the medians 
and part b) the means. The means, medians and standard deviations of total pension 
income are presented also in Appendix Table A1. Median pension income is EUR 293; the 
mean is EUR 471. The male mean is EUR 539 and that for females is EUR 422. The implied 
female-to-male ratio is 78 per cent. If we compare this ratio to the female-to-male labour 
earnings ratio of 75 per cent, we get an indication that replacement rates might be higher 
for women than for men in our sample. While a higher replacement rate for women might 
appear, at face value, to be a positive finding for women, it should be understood that the 
higher replacement rate results from lower female earnings. This illustrates the point made 
above of the need to understand the components of the replacement rates. We will say 
more on this when we look at the estimated replacement rates. 
As would be expected, pension incomes rise with education levels and with occupation 
levels and are higher for public sector workers. However, in each case labour earnings were 
also shown to be higher. Therefore, the difference in replacement rates between these 
groups depends on the level of pension income these groups receive relative to their 
previous labour earnings.  
A further building block before looking directly at replacement rates is to consider how 
pension income is made up across the three sources – the three pillars of pension income – 
for people in our sample. As with the presentation in the earlier figures, an understanding of 
pension income by source will aid in understanding the patterns on replacement rates. We 
look at this in part b) of Figure 2.5 The mean total pension income of EUR 471 is made up of 
the following components: an average state social welfare pension of EUR 89; an average 
occupation pension payment of EUR 353; an average private pension payment of EUR 28. 
These figures imply that 19 per cent of average pension income is made up of the social 
welfare pension (EUR 89/ EUR 471). However, this average of 19 per cent hides large 
variation across groups and this is best illustrated by the educational categories. For those 
with low levels of education, the social welfare pensions make up 64 per cent of their 
pension income. For those with high levels of education the corresponding figure is 7 per 
cent. This points to the importance of the social welfare pensions for lower income groups 
and the impact of this component of pensions on replacement rates will be seen below. 
                                                          
5 The mean and median pension incomes from different pensions (state welfare pensions, occupational 
pensions and private pensions) are listed in Appendix Table A2, along with standard deviations. 
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Figure 2: Pension income 
a) Medians 
 
b) Means, with pension component breakdown 
Lightest bar: occupational pensions Medium bar: private pensions Darkest bar: social welfare pensions 
 
*Education level: 1: None / primary, 2: Secondary, 3: Third level / higher 
** Occupation types: 1: Semi-skilled/Unskilled, 2: Non-manual/Skilled manual, 3: Professional/Managerial/Technical
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Part a) of Figure 3 combines the earlier pictures of labour and pensions incomes. Here, we 
examine the means of these two figures in one set of graphs, providing a visual 
representation of the components of the replacement rates. Although both labour earnings 
and pensions incomes vary, there is less variation in the proportionate falls between both 
types of income across the various breakdowns. This leads to an expectation of lower 
variability in replacement rates compared to either labour or pension incomes and this is 
what emerges as we examine means of retirement income replacement rates in part b) of 
Figure 3. 
The first point to be read from Figure 3 b) is that the average replacement rate in the 
sample is 78 per cent.6 Given the stated policy target of 50 per cent replacement rates, this 
estimate is perhaps surprisingly high. The median replacement rate is 50 per cent (not 
shown in the figure, but provided in Appendix Table A1) which might be more in line with 
expectations. From this mean and median comparison, it seems that the distribution is 
skewed towards some high values.  
When we look beyond the overall value, some interesting points emerge. First, based on 
mean values, the female replacement rate is higher than the male replacement rate – 89 
per cent for women and 63 per cent for men. As discussed above, the higher value for 
women is driven by lower female labour earnings and certainly not by higher pension 
incomes. Again, we note the median values which are 49 per cent for women and 50 per 
cent for men. Second, in spite of the fact that there is a positive relationship between 
education level and both labour earnings and pension income, there is a negative 
relationship between education level and replacement rates. Third, and echoing the finding 
with respect to education, the lowest occupation group has the highest replacement rates. 
The mean replacement rate for the highest occupation group is 73 per cent. This falls to 68 
per cent for the middle occupation group and then rises again to 93 per cent for the lowest 
group. Such a U-shaped relationship was also found by Nivakoski (2014) with respect to 
education for all retirees so it is not entirely surprising.  
Finally, we can note that the median replacement rates for the three education groups are 
as follows: for the highest group, the median value if 47 per cent; for the middle group, it is 
49 per cent; for the lowest group it is 66 per cent. For the occupation groups, the median 
values are more centred: the value for the lowest occupation group is 52 per cent; it is 50 
per cent for the middle group and 49 per cent for the highest group.  
The broad picture to emerge from Figure 3 b) is of a greater degree of equality with respect 
to retirement income replacement rates when compared to incomes either before or after 
retirement. This feature of Ireland’s pension system was also observed Nivakoski (2014) and 
she went on to explore the role played by the social welfare pensions in bringing about this 
pattern. We follow this approach and explore the component parts of replacement rates 
shown in Figure 3 b).  
                                                          
6 When comparing average earnings and pension incomes with average replacement rates, one needs to bear 
in mind that the mean of the ratios of two variables is not equal to the ratio of their means. Therefore, the 
ratio of mean labour earnings (EUR 899) to mean pension income (EUR 471) – which is 52 per cent – does not 
equal the mean of the (individually calculated) replacement rates (78 per cent). 
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A strong and fascinating picture emerges of the key role played by the social welfare 
pensions in equalising outcomes. Focussing on the education component of the figure, it can 
be seen how replacement rates based only on supplementary pensions (occupational and 
private) result in a positive relationship between education levels replacement rates. 
However, the impact of the social welfare pension is to boost replacement rates for lower 
educational groups to a much greater extent (proportionately) and so the pattern for total 
replacement rates is reversed. A similar picture emerges with respect to occupation. 
Replacement rates based only on supplementary pensions are positively related to 
occupational grade. The social welfare pensions do not reverse the pattern fully but they 
lead to the U-shaped distribution discussed above and the vast improvement in 
replacement rates for lower occupational grades.  
Examining differences between individuals retiring from public and private sector 
employment, it can be seen that we have estimated mean replacement rates to be higher 
for people retiring from the private sector (83 per cent) compared to people retiring from 
the public sector (75 per cent). The median values are essentially the same (51 per cent and 
50 per cent respectively) but the finding on mean values may be somewhat surprising. The 
decomposition of replacement rates into social welfare and supplementary pension 
components provides one clue as to the source of this result. It can be seen that if we only 
consider supplementary (occupational and private) pensions there is a higher replacement 
rate in the public sector. As with our analysis of education and occupation above, the 
inclusion of social welfare pensions alters the pattern. As many of the public servants in our 
sample would not have had access to the state social welfare pension, the observed pattern 
seems plausible. 
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Figure 3 
a) Mean labour earnings and mean pension income 
 
b) Mean Replacement Rate, with pension component breakdown 
Lighter bar: social welfare pensions  Darker bar: supplementary (occupational or private) pensions
*Education level: 1: None / primary, 2: Secondary, 3: Third level / higher 
** Occupation types: 1: Semi-skilled/Unskilled, 2: Non-manual/Skilled manual, 3: Professional/Managerial/Technical
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We look next at the relationship between replacement rates and labour earnings. Our 
analysis above of the relationship between education and occupational levels and 
replacement rates suggests that replacement rates are more equally distributed than 
incomes – both labour and pension incomes – so a direct examination of the relationship 
between labour earnings and subsequent replacement rates is of interest. 
As with our approach above, it is useful to look first at the components of the replacement 
rate separately, so that the pattern of replacement rates is more readily understood. In 
Figure 4, we examine labour earnings and pension income across the five earnings quintiles. 
One point to emerge is that, although both pension and labour incomes rise across the 
quintiles, the rise for labour income is steeper. In Figure 11, we show the pension 
components across the quintiles. Once again, the importance of the social welfare pensions 
at the lower end of the distribution becomes evident. Turning to replacement rates in Figure 
12, we see a pattern which mirrors the U-shaped relationship between occupational status 
and replacement rates shown above. The extremely high replacement rates in the first 
quintile should be treated with a high degree of caution because they arise in part from 
some very low reported labour earnings. The results in quintiles 2 to 5 are more meaningful. 
Supplementary pensions provide lower replacement rates for quintiles 2 and 3 compared 
with the top two quintiles. However, the increase in the replacement rate provided by the 
social welfare pensions is much more significant in quintile 2 and so the U-shape emerges as 
a result of the state social welfare pension. 
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Figure 4: Analysis by labour earnings quintile 
a) Mean labour earnings and pension income 
Darker bar: labour earnings Lighter bar: pension income 
 
b) Mean pension income, from different pensions 
 
Lightest bar: occupational pensions Medium bar: private pensions Darkest bar: social welfare pensions 
 
 
c) Mean replacement rate, from different pensions 
Lighter bar: supplementary pensions Darker bar: social welfare pensions 
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As a final strand in our analysis of replacement rates, we use regression analysis to look at 
the various determinants in a multi-variate context. Following the approach above, we look 
at labour earnings and pension income also. The most striking point to emerge from Table 2 
is the lack of statistically significant coefficients in the regression where the replacement 
rate is the dependent variable. While this is striking, it is not too surprising based on the 
findings above. The regression model is again showing how the pensions system seems to 
have an equalising effect across groups. For the regression with labour earnings as the 
dependent variable, familiar patterns are present such as higher earnings for third level 
graduates and for professionals. But as noted, these are not seen in the last regression.  
Table 2: OLS Regression results 
  1 2 3 
  Labour earnings Pension income Replacement Rate 
        
female -138.9 -121.1 18.9 
  -112.3 -110.0 -17.6 
Education: Primary/none (ref.) - - - 
  - - - 
Education: Secondary 201.9 33.8 -2.6 
  -156.8 -153.5 -24.5 
Education: Third level/higher 414.1** 268.8 -5.1 
  -169.6 -166.1 -26.5 
Semi-skilled/Unskilled (ref.) - - - 
  - - - 
Non-manual/Skilled manual 185.8 120.0 -29.1 
  -148.7 -145.7 -23.3 
Professional/Managerial/Technical 501.7*** 236.5 -15.2 
  -152.5 -149.4 -23.9 
Public sector -32.4 18.6 -15.2 
  -111.1 -108.8 -17.4 
Full-time 404.6*** 230.2** -18.7 
  -112.0 -109.6 -17.5 
Constant 172.7 94.0 105.4*** 
  -176.4 -172.8 -27.6 
        
Observations 340 340 340 
R-squared 0.152 0.065 0.017 
 
Section 4: Conclusion 
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Our analysis has produced a number of key findings. First, when viewed in simple terms, our 
finding of a mean replacement rate of 78 per cent looks very positive. However, this overall 
value is partly the product of extremely high values at the lower end of the distribution and 
may be a function of low reported earnings immediately prior to retirement – possibly due 
to part-time work. The replacement rate values shown in Figure 4 across the second to fifth 
income quintiles are possibly more representative of actual replacement rates. Similarly, our 
findings of median replacement rates being generally in the 50 per cent range also provide 
more representative information. 
The second key set of findings relates to the distribution of replacement rates as opposed to 
the levels. We have generally found the replacement rates are distributed more equally 
than incomes. Female replacement rates are higher as were those for lower occupational 
and education groups. However, it should be stressed that these result are driven by lower 
earnings. A third set of findings relates to the crucial role played by the social welfare 
pensions in generating the greater degree of equality in replacement rates. 
A number of implications can be distilled from the findings. First, the people in the data that 
we observe retiring are from that generation where defined benefit schemes were more 
prevalent. This is also the group that was somewhat immune from the economic collapse of 
2007/08. These factors lead to the question of whether future waves of retirees will have 
lower replacement rates and whether current retirees are part of a “golden generation” 
from a retirement perspective. The question is important because any weakening of policy 
interest based on relatively favourable outcomes for current retirees could disadvantage 
future retirees. In this context, there will be a need for the on-going monitoring of 
replacement rates as people retire. There is also a need to project future replacement rates 
for representative samples of the population. 
The second implication arises from the material on the distribution of replacement rates, 
specifically the U-shaped pattern with respect to occupation levels and earnings. It appears 
that the social welfare pensions perform a strong and successful role in raising replacement 
rates at the lower end of the socioeconomic distribution and that supplementary pensions 
work well at the upper end. However, there is a middle group who seem to do less well on 
the metric of replacement rates. This pattern is a challenge for other dimension of social 
policy where targeted state interventions are focused on lower socioeconomic groups and 
where higher groups can purchase the service in question (in this case pensions).  
Third, the success of the social welfare pensions points to the need to protect this tool of 
social policy. The critical role of these pensions was shown in Nivakoski (2014) and has been 
shown here again.  
Finally, we can return to the question of the implications of the findings for policy goals set 
in terms of replacement rates. The findings of very high replacement rates at the lower end 
of the earnings distribution prompts a questions as to the meaning of a policy goal of 
achieving a single replacement rate target across the earnings distribution. If levels of 
income matter to people, as opposed to income ratios, then a policy stated as a single ratio 
might not lead to optimal outcomes. It might be more appropriate to think it terms of a 
sliding scale of replacement rate targets or for targets to be set in terms of income levels 
and not replacement rates. More broadly, and following MacDonald et al (2016), it might 
make sense to set policy on income in retirement in a framework that emphasises the 
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maintenance of living standard as opposed to income levels.  Similarly, Brady (2010) talks 
about the need to replace consumption as opposed to income and shows the importance of 
taking into account variables such as savings and taxation, pre and post retirement, and also 
owner occupied housing. Whichever approach is taken, the results here suggest that the 
single replacement rate target is unlikely to capture the multiplicity of circumstances which 
pensions policy must aim to address.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Means, medians and standard deviations of labour earnings (EUR per week, gross), pension 
income (EUR per week, gross) and Replacement Rates 
  
 Labour earnings Total pension income Replacement Rate   
 Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd N 
           
All 899 700 1066 471 293 931 78 50 153 354 
           
Gender           
Male 1051 900 1125 539 393 1072 63 50 82 146 
Female 793 572 1012 422 239 818 89 49 187 208 
           
Education           
Primary/none 483 425 328 277 230 202 86 66 82 55 
Secondary 766 600 1107 372 256 645 83 49 182 142 
Third/higher 1165 1025 1130 628 450 1235 71 47 143 157 
           
Location           
Dublin 992 850 1025 539 300 1152 62 45 99 109 
Other town/city 1034 675 1563 440 329 756 98 50 218 104 
Rural 732 657 457 444 268 864 76 53 127 139 
           
Occupation type           
Professional/Managerial/Technical 1188 1150 900 625 559 934 73 49 142 157 
Non-manual/Skilled manual 718 500 1185 375 230 1085 68 50 103 119 
Semi-skilled/Unskilled  472 423 320 236 234 133 93 52 197 64 
           
Employment sector           
Private 782 500 1189 383 230 936 83 51 157 140 
Public 976 863 972 528 398 926 75 50 150 214 
           
Part-time / Full-time           
Part-time 552 340 918 268 225 260 92 56 156 134 
Full-time 1110 950 1096 594 400 1148 70 48 151 220 
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Table A2: Means, medians and standard deviations of pension income from different sources (EUR per 
week, gross)  
 
 
 State welfare pensions Occupational pensions Private pensions Total pension income  
 Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd Mean Median Sd N 
              
All 89 0 116 353 114 838 28 0 466 471 293 931 354 
              
Gender              
Male 96 0 130 438 207 1093 5 0 31 539 393 1072 146 
Female 84 0 105 294 50 594 44 0 607 422 239 818 208 
              
Education              
Primary/none 178 228 115 95 9 194 5 0 33 277 230 202 55 
Secondary 101 0 122 266 37 659 5 0 31 372 256 645 142 
Third/higher 47 0 88 523 425 1060 57 0 698 628 450 1235 157 
              
Location              
Dublin 68 0 102 468 150 1168 3 0 24 539 300 1152 109 
Other town/city 109 0 121 327 125 773 5 0 32 440 329 756 104 
Rural 91 0 120 288 43 517 65 0 742 444 268 864 139 
              
Occupation type              
Professional/Managerial/Technical 51 0 101 513 500 677 61 0 699 625 559 934 157 
Non-manual/Skilled manual 95 0 113 277 0 1099 3 0 23 375 230 1085 119 
Semi-skilled/Unskilled  166 225 115 69 0 123 0 0 4 236 234 133 64 
              
Employment sector              
Private 130 165 125 251 0 946 3 0 26 383 230 936 140 
Public 63 0 102 421 300 753 44 0 598 528 398 926 214 
              
Part-time / Full-time              
Part-time 105 54 109 162 0 268 2 0 16 268 225 260 134 
Full-time 80 0 119 470 286 1026 44 0 590 594 400 1148 220 
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Figure A1: Distribution of labour earnings, pension income, and Replacement Rates 
 
 
Figure A2: Distribution of weekly hours worked (pre-retirement) 
 
 
 
Year Number Title/Author(s) 
2017   
 574 Sea bass angling in Ireland: A structural equation 
model of catch and effort  
Gianluca Grilli, John Curtis, Stephen Hynes and Paul 
O’Reilly 
 573 Ireland’s international trade and transport connections 
Martina Lawless and Edgar Morgenroth 
 572 Do youth access control policies stop young people 
smoking? Evidence from Ireland Michael Savage 
 571 
 
The impact of investment in innovation on 
productivity: firm level evidence from Ireland Mattia Di 
Ubaldo and Iulia Siedschlag 
 570 The value of tourist angling: a travel cost method 
estimation of demand for two destination salmon 
rivers in Ireland 
Gianluca Grilli, John Curtis, Stephen Hynes and Gavin 
Landgraf 
 569 Advertising and investment spillovers in the diffusion 
of residential energy efficiency renovations  
Matthew Collins and John Curtis  
 568 Working at a different level? Curriculum differentiation 
in Irish lower secondary education  
Emer Smyth 
 567 Identifying rent pressures in your neighbourhood: a 
new model of Irish regional rent indicators 
Martina Lawless, Kieran McQuinn and John R. Walsh 
 566 Who pays for renewables? Increasing renewable 
subsidisation due to increased datacentre demand in 
Ireland 
Muireann Á. Lynch and Mel T. Devine 
 565 Can tenants afford to care? Investigating the 
willingness-to-pay for improved energy efficiency of 
rental tenants and returns to investment for landlords 
Matthew Collins and John Curtis 
 564 Female participation increases and gender segregation 
Claire Keane, Helen Russell and Emer Smyth 
 563 Pike (Esox lucius) stock management in designated 
brown trout (Salmo trutta) fisheries: Anglers’ 
preferences 
John Curtis 
 562 Financial incentives for residential energy efficiency 
investments in Ireland: Should the status quo be 
maintained? 
Matthew Collins, Seraphim Dempsey and John Curtis 
 
For earlier Working Papers see http://ww.esri.ie  
 
